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Abstract: While Strawsonians have focused on the way in which our “reactive attitudes”—the 
emotions through which we hold one another responsible for manifestations of morally 
significant quality of regard—express moral demands, serious doubt has been cast on the idea 
that non-blaming reactive attitudes direct moral demands to their targets. Building on Gary 
Watson’s proposal that the reactive attitudes are ‘forms of moral address’, this paper advances 
a communicative view of praise according to which the form of moral address distinctive of the 
praise-manifesting reactive attitudes (approbation, gratitude) is moral invitation. Like moral 
demand, moral invitation is a species of directive address presupposing its target’s possession 
of distinctive agential capacities and, when valid, provides its addressee with reason to give the 
addressor’s directive discursive uptake. While blame’s demands issue imperatival reasons for 
compliance (e.g. to acknowledge wrongdoing, apologize, etc.), praise’s invitations provide 
discretionary reasons to accept credit in jointly valuing the significance of the act for the praiser. 
In addition to its phenomenological plausibility and contribution to the already fecund 
Watsonian-cum-Strawsonian program, the invitational view helps renders intelligible the power 
of our praise practices to facilitate the formation and enrichment of our interpersonal 
relationships. 
 
Introduction  
Following Gary Watson, a range of Strawsonian theorists of moral responsibility understand 
the praise- and blame-manifesting reactive attitudes to be “incipient forms of communication” 
or “forms of moral address” (Watson 1987: 229-231). These theorists tend to identify demand 
as the relevant form of address.1 Stephen Darwall, for example, writes that “reactive attitudes 
implicitly address demands. They invariably involve ‘an expectation of, and demand for’ 
certain conduct from one another” (Darwall 2007: 118). David Shoemaker similarly claims that 
“our practices in voicing the praise and blame expressive of holding someone morally 
responsible, in the paradigm case, consist of an interplay between at least two agents, one who 
addresses a moral demand to the other via the praise or blame and the other who ostensibly 
hears, understands, and either accepts or rejects the demand” (Shoemaker 2007: 70, italics 
added). The appeal of this ‘demand-focused’ view of the reactive attitudes—which has clear 
                                               
1 See Darwall 2006, 2011; Helm 2017; McKenna 2012, 2013; Shoemaker 2011, 2013, 2015; Wallace 1994, 2019; 
Watson 1987, 1996, 2008, 2011.  
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roots in Peter Strawson’s claims that reactive attitudes “involve, or express, a certain sort of 
demand for inter-personal regard,” or that there is a “demand for good will or regard which is 
reflected in our ordinary reactive attitudes” (Strawson 1962: 85; 78)— is understandable in light 
of the Strawsonian effort of articulating a view of moral responsibility based not in the abstract 
metaphysics of determinism and free will, but in our social practices of mutually holding one 
another to norms.2  
 While there is disagreement about what it is exactly for blame-manifesting attitudes to 
address demands, the idea that blame targets the blameworthy agent demandingly seems to 
capture an important feature of our practices of moral blame. In blaming another one does not 
merely suggest, or flag it as an option, that the blameworthy agent attend to his culpable action; 
one communicates that he must do so. With praise things are different. Gratitude and 
approbation, the paradigmatic other-directed reactive attitudes of praise, do not seem to demand 
anything of their targets. This is not a novel thought. In a relatively early response to “Freedom 
and Resentment”, Jonathan Bennett (1980: 42) writes: “I doubt if ‘demand’ really covers all the 
ground: I can find no place for it in describing such undisappointed reactive feelings as those 
of gratitude […]”. Even if demands have something to do with praise—perhaps demands 
(referring to what can be morally demanded of others) figure in the contents of praise attitudes, 
as they would if praise represents one to have exceeded a normative demand (Darwall 2006: 
73; McKenna 2012: 8, 49; Shoemaker 2013: 117; Helm 2017: 53)— this does not make it any 
more plausible that in praising a praiseworthy agent I am making a demand of her.3   
Moral address can intuitively take a range of forms beyond that of demand, e.g. urging, 
advising, promising, inviting, requesting, etc. In claiming that “holding responsible requires the 
intelligibility of moral address…[where] a condition of such address is that the other be seen as 
a potential moral interlocutor”, Watson (1987: 235) seems to avail himself of range of candidate 
forms of moral address. Demand, being a familiar and credible notion in moral and legal theory, 
understandably presented itself as an attractive home for the Strawsonian view. But a larger 
home is necessary, at least if we hope to accommodate a fuller range of reactive attitudes. To 
                                               
2 Not all Strawsonians adopt the Watsonian-cum-Strawsonian view that reactive attitudes are forms of moral 
address. See e.g. Fischer & Ravizza (1998); Russell (2004); Brink and Nelkin (2013); Graham (2014); Rosen 
(2015;) Carlsson (2017); Portmore (2019). Others still take the reactive attitudes to be forms of address but deny 
that demands are central (or even characteristic of blame’s form of address). See Macnamara (2013, 2015); Mason 
(2017). 
3 For other versions of this kind of point, see Macnamara (2011, 2013); Russell (2013); Eshleman (2014); King 
(2014); Martin (2014). 
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this end, and building on work that is sympathetic to the communicative view yet skeptical of 
the prospects for the demand-focused conception to elucidate our praising responses 
(Macnamara 2013; Mason 2017; Telech 2020), this paper seeks to identify the form of address 
lying at the heart of our praise-manifesting reactive attitudes.  
The view that the reactive attitudes are “forms of moral address” gets articulated in a 
range of ways by different philosophers. For example, Darwall (2006: 75) describes reactive 
attitudes as “quasi-speech act[s]”, for like speech acts, the reactive attitudes presuppose for their 
success that the addressor and addressee be suitably related and that the addressee possess 
capacities requisite to understand and respond to the meaning of the address. Sometimes the 
reactive attitudes are taken to be communicative in that these emotions are constituted in part 
by a motivational tendency to address the target of the attitude in a particular way (Shoemaker 
2015: 104). We need not settle here on the details of the communicative view. For, my 
interlocuters in what follows already endorse (or are at least sympathetic to) some version of 
the communicative view of the reactive attitudes. The broad agreement among them (and 
myself) allows me to operate at a level of generality that passes over important questions 
concerning how exactly the reactive attitudes are communicative.4 
In what follows I take for granted that the reactive attitudes are forms of moral address 
in that they: i) seek uptake from their addressee; ii) in seeking uptake they presuppose their 
target’s possession of certain agential (e.g. cognitive and motivational) capacities requisite for 
giving moral address uptake; iii) carry normative force, i.e. when valid, the address provides its 
addressees with (defeasible) normative reason for uptake. For the purposes of this paper, 
commitment to the “communicative view of the reactive attitudes” entails acceptance of some 
version of i-iii.5 Whichever way one understands blame’s demands will dictate filling in the 
details of i-iii in some (more or less) determinate manner, which can then serve as a guide in 
filling in the corresponding details for a communicative view of praise. 
My aim is to advance a broadly Strawsonian, communicative, view of moral praise 
according to which our praise-manifesting reactive attitudes are incipient forms of moral 
                                               
4 Those unsympathetic to Strawsonian views can, however, read what follows as an account of a normatively 
significant social phenomenon that bears important relations to (and perhaps picks out a subspecies of) praise, 
understood in non-Strawsonian terms. 
5 So, views of blame as protest (Hieronymi 2001, 2019; Smith 2013; Talbert 2012) are not for our purposes 
communicative views, for protest seeks not uptake from its target, but rather has as its function (something like) 
one’s standing up for the victim. A complication: Smith’s (2013: 43) brand of the protest view incorporates a 
communicative element.  
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invitation. I proceed by attending to approbation and gratitude. The communicative nature of 
the latter has been noted by Strawsonians and others (e.g. Berger 1975; Smith TMS II.III.10; 
Shoemaker 2013: 117; Herman 2012: 406; Darwall 2019). Gratitude calls for a response from 
its addressee, but this “call” lacks the imperatival force of demand. I propose that praise-
manifesting reactive attitudes are profitably construed as addressing their targets with moral 
invitations to jointly value the praiseworthy agent’s manifestation of good will. Moral 
invitations, like moral demands, provide their addressees with reasons to ‘do something’ 
(because so directed), but their reason-giving force is of a gentler, non-binding, sort. For, the 
addressee of a invitation is directed to do something desirable, with the inviter (Geis 1995: 
113). In particular, she is invited to engage in a form of joint valuation that is at once a way of 
accepting credit.  
An invitational view of reactive praise provides a useful lens for theorizing the 
capacities agents must possess to be fittingly praised. For, praise’s invitations presuppose their 
addressee’s ability to give moral invitation uptake, i.e., to accept credit from another, in feeling 
and communicating one’s pride in the value for another of one’s manifestation of good will. 
This ability to accept invitations presupposes that the agent is able to understand and be 
motivated by the normative considerations of which praise’s invitations are reflective. Since 
praise’s invitations are communicatively successful when the praiser and praisee jointly value 
the praiseworthy agent’s action, the invitational view also renders intelligible the way in which 
praise tends towards the enhancement of relationships, and otherwise benefits the praisee. 
Additionally, the interest-promoting nature of invitation renders the invitational view of praise 
amendable to the view, endorsed by some proponents of the communicative view, that to be 
morally responsible for some action entails one’s deserving certain forms of responses or 
treatment. In outlining the contributions it affords for understanding reactive praise, a case is 
made for adding moral invitation to our repertoire of concepts of moral address, and in 
particular, for identifying moral invitation as the form of address characteristic of reactive 
praise. 
I proceed as follows. In section 1, I clarify the sense of “praise” at issue. In section 2, I 
propose that praise’s invitations are a species of directed invitation that presupposes its target’s 
having manifested good will (/regard). I introduce terminology in section 2.1 to characterize 
the subset of manifestations of good will that are the fitting targets of praise’s invitations. 
Section 2.3 argues that moral invitation seeks uptake in the addressee’s “directed pride”, and 
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that successful uptake of reactive praise gives rise to instances of joint valuing between the 
praiser and the praisee. By attending to two characteristic ways that moral invitations can fail, 
section 2.4 highlights the agential capacities presupposed by reactive praise. In section 3, I turn 
to the normativity of praise’s invitations. In 3.1 I maintain that praise’s invitations, being 
directives, have discretionary normative force; they provide their addressees with discretionary 
reason to do as invited. In 3.2 I propose that the invitational view of praise can help us 
understand the way in which praise tends both to benefit the praisee and to build and enhance 
relationships among members of the moral community. Before concluding, I identify the way 
in which the invitational account is amendable to (without presupposing) the view that 
susceptibility to reactive attitudes implies desert of some interest-affecting response. 
 
1. Reactive Praise   
In the sense of interest to me, to “praise” someone for some action is, at a minimum, to 
positively evaluate and take non-instrumental satisfaction in their performance of that action, 
and on that basis to be motivated to respond positively toward the praisee.6 While it might be 
possible to praise an agent for some action without therein feeling a positively valanced emotion 
toward that agent for her action, it is no accident that, following Strawson (1962) positive 
reactive attitudes like approbation and gratitude are often identified as vehicles of praise 
(Macnamara 2011, 2013; McKenna 2012; Shoemaker 2013, 2015; Martin 2014; Russell 2013; 
Eshleman 2014; Rosen 2015; Helm 2017; Björnsson 2017; Coates 2019). Though the English 
word, “praise”, suggests overt acts, Strawsonians treat interpersonal attitudes like approbation 
and gratitude as ways of emotionally responding to the moral meaning of praiseworthy actions, 
and as such, as ways of responding to agents with praise. As Coleen Macnamara (2011: 84) 
puts it, “when I feel gratitude when my friend does me a favor, admiration when my sister 
volunteers at a soup kitchen, or approval when I witness a stranger perform a small act of 
kindness, I am praising my friend, my sister, and the stranger.” While gratitude positively 
evaluates and takes satisfaction in an agent’s acting well toward oneself, approbation positively 
evaluates and takes satisfaction in an agent’s acting well toward another. 7 On this type of view, 
                                               
6 There may be other forms of praise, e.g. the praise involved in what is sometimes called responsibility in the 
attributability sense (Watson 1996; Shoemaker 2011, 2015). On a prominent version of the attributability view, 
actions are attributable to us in virtue of revealing the quality of our characters, and to praise an agent in the 
attributability sense is thus to attribute a virtue of character to an agent on the basis of a virtue-manifesting action. 
7 This is not to deny that one can, in principle, feel approbation in response to how one himself is treated. Extending 
a distinction from Darwall (2012) between individual and representative authority, we can say that if I evaluate 
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gratitude and approbation are the personal and vicarious counterparts, respectively, to 
resentment and indignation, the emotions of other-directed blame. 
While Strawsonians anchor praise and blame in reactive emotions, they understand 
expressions of reactive attitudes as ways of praising or blaming, too. As Macnamara (2015: 
546-7) writes, “We blame both when we express our resentment (“You jerk!”) and when we 
keep it buried in our hearts. We praise both when we approve of another and when we express 
this approval (“That was a lovely thing to do”).” Views on which reactive attitudes are 
communicative might point to a motivational link between the reactive attitudes and their 
expression that explains why both attitudes and actions can count as praise and blame: praise- 
and blame-manifesting actions are expressive of praise- and blame-manifesting attitudes that 
are partly constituted by the motivation to act in a manner characteristic of the attitude type. For 
theorists who take blame-manifesting attitudes to address demands, this will be a demanding 
manner (where the content of the demand may include, “acknowledge your wrongdoing (of me) 
[resentment]/ (of him/her/them) [indignation]). It is the goal of this paper to provide an answer 
to the question, how do the praise-manifesting attitudes address their targets? 
For some responsibility theorists, the kind of praise of interest to me can be labeled 
“accountability praise”. Although talk of ‘holding accountable’ associated with accountability 
is idiomatically better suited to blame, if the relevant form of ‘holding’ is that secured by 
features peculiar to a class of reactive attitudes and their expression, there may be no real barrier 
to theorizing about ‘accountability praise’, nor of speaking of “holding praiseworthy” or 
“holding “to praise”” (McKenna 2012: 37). Still, I won’t insist here on the label, “accountability 
praise”. The label, “reactive praise” will suffice for my purposes. For my aim is primarily to 
identify the form of address that lies at the heart of the communicative praise associated with 
the reactive attitudes, however we are to situate this phenomenon in our broader theory 
(/theories) of moral responsibility.  
Finally, while aspects of the invitational view may prove applicable to the praise 
directed to agents for non-moral feats (e.g. aesthetic, epistemic, athletic), I am concerned with 
the kind of praise directed toward others for manifestations of quality of regard. Reactive praise, 
my topic, is a variety of moral praise. Finally, without denying that sense may be made of the 
                                               
my benefactor’s action impersonally, I may—like any other “representative” of the moral community—feel 
approbation. Still, given the salience of its ‘being me’ that was the beneficiary of some praiseworthy action, 
gratitude is likely to be the dominant response in such circumstances. 
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idea that reflexive praise involves a form of self-address (namely, self-invitation), I argue only 
for the claim that other-directed praise is fruitfully understood on the model of invitation. The 
praisee’s first-personal uptake of another’s praise will be an important part of the account given, 
but I leave the question of self-address for another time.8  
 
2 Praise and Moral Invitation  
2.1 I propose that approbation and gratitude, being praise-manifesting reactive attitudes, 
address moral invitations to their addressees, where these are invitations to jointly value what 
the praiseworthy agent’s manifestation of regard meant for the praising agent. As an invitation 
is a type of directive address, it is conceptually connected to the response it seeks, i.e. the 
addressee’s acceptance. As I specify below, since praise’s invitations are backward-looking 
responses that presuppose their target’s meriting credit, to accept praise is to accept credit from 
the praiser. While the invitation to take credit paradigmatically comes in the form of 
approbation and gratitude, is acceptance consists in the addressee’s emotionally registering, by 
feeling a type of pride about, the significance of her action for the inviter. As approbation (like 
gratitude) is an affective way of valuing a manifestation of good will that seeks an affective 
valuing response from the addressee, i.e. directed pride—where both attitudes are about the 
same action from different perspectives —its invitation finds communicative success in the 
joint valuing of the significance of the initial action. Now, to substantiate these claims. 
 Moral invitations are a species of directed invitation. In contrast to general invitations, 
like those for the 10th Annual Evangeline Country Music Festival, to which “[e]veryone is 
invited for an enjoyable country music weekend”,9 reactive praise’s invitations are addressed 
to a particular individual (or individuals). That moral invitations are personally directed in this 
way is entailed by their being backward-looking responses that presuppose their target’s 
meriting credit for some manifestation of good will. That is, the invitation targets the addressee 
on the basis of the perceived praiseworthiness of the action it is about. This backward-looking 
feature distinguishes “moral invitation”, in my technical sense, from other kinds of directed 
invitations that may be morally relevant, e.g. those perhaps issued in the making of a promise. 
That is, it is sometimes held that in promising another to perform some action, one invites the 
(potential) promisee to trust the promise-maker (e.g. Shiffrin 2008, Pink 2009; Marusic 2014). 
                                               
8 Unless otherwise noted, then, “praise” designates reactive praise of the other-directed variety.  
9 “Tenth annual" (2019)   
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While promises will typically be made in response to something the prospective promisee did 
(and so may be ‘backward-looking’ in this trivial sense), they are not, like “moral invitations”, 
necessarily ways of recognizing their addressee’s morally significant conduct. Moral invitations 
recognize their addressee’s conduct in that they represent their addressee to have done 
something that (or, in a way that presupposes that she) merits credit.  Something close to the 
relevant sense of invitation is captured in ordinary language through locutions of the form: ‘S 
is invited to E in recognition of A’, as in: “Reuben was invited [to the Royal Wedding] in 
recognition of his work within the deaf community and for raising awareness of the issues 
facing Deaf children”.10   
 
2.2 Like the invitation Reuben receives, moral invitations recognize something significant in 
their target’s conduct. They represent their target as, in some way, having done something good. 
An account of the formal object of praise should tell us, in more determinate terms, how reactive 
praise represents its target. Praise, I have said, represents another to have manifested good 
quality of regard (or benevolence). But praise is presumably reserved for a subset of such 
benevolent manifestations. After all, one’s smile, greeting, or wave might manifest good quality 
of regard, but they are not obviously the fitting objects of approbation or gratitude. Similarly, 
one’s manner of sitting might manifest poor quality of regard (indifference, malevolence, and 
everything in between) without being a fitting target of reactive blame. To specify the proper 
objects of blaming attitudes, Strawsonians employ the term “demand” to refer to the normative 
consideration that is flouted when an agent’s conduct renders blame fitting.11 When an agent is 
praiseworthy, she too will be worthy of praise in virtue of how she acted or omitted (/manifested 
good will) relative to some norm. It is not my goal here to provide an account of this norm. For 
now, in order to fix terminology to distinguish the subset of manifestations of good will that are 
fitting targets of praise, we can employ as a placeholder the term “laudable standard”, so that 
the class of morally praiseworthy actions— fitting objects of praise’s invitations—are 
manifestations of good will that reach a laudable standard.12 Perhaps one’s meeting a laudatory 
                                               
10 British Deaf News Team (2018)  
11 There is disagreement about whether “moral demand” should be understood in deontic terms, as per Wallace 
(1994) and Darwall (2006, 2011), or more capaciously, to include actions that are morally bad but not wrong, as 
per McKenna (2012), Macnamara (2011), and Shoemaker (2015).    
12 The content of this standard may be sensitive to the dispositions of the members of particular moral communities. 
That is, whether some agent A’s action or omission meets a “laudatory standard” in a given moral community 
might be determined in part by the comparison class of which A is a part. Additionally, on a suitably nuanced 
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standard entails one’s having exceeded a moral obligation (or acted supererogatorily), perhaps 
not. I put this issue aside.13 Finally, though my focus here is on responses through which we 
recognize agents to have reached a laudable standard, we can also speak of prospective 
invitations that we sometimes direct, ex ante, toward agents capable of meeting (/aspiring 
toward) such standards, with the hope that they do so.14 
Praise, then, represents the addressee to have manifested good will in a way that reaches 
a laudable standard i.e. to have acted laudably. Of course, the praisee might not in fact have 
acted laudably, but that just means that praise can be unfitting. Similarly, Reuben might be 
invited to X in recognition of Y, though he failed to do Y or though his Y-ing was not worthy 
of recognition. 
One might wonder whether this talk of ‘moral invitation’ helps us understand the 
phenomenon at hand. Can we not make do with the simpler claim that praise involves 
recognition of another’s having acted laudably?15 In reply, I maintain that while praises does 
involve recognition, it does more than this. For, blame too involves a kind of recognition, 
namely that another has acted culpably. That is, part of what blame does is register recognition 
of moral failure.16 My interlocutor, being a proponent of the communicative view, maintains 
that blame does more than this, however. In particular, he maintains that blame makes a demand 
of its target. As this demand involves (or presupposes) recognition of wrongdoing, reactive 
blame will both i) represent (/recognize) the agent to have acted culpably and ii) make a demand 
of the target (to apologize, etc.). Accordingly, we can describe blame as addressing culpability-
recognizing demands. Now, it is true that praise involves recognition of laudability. But to say 
this, by the communicative theorist’s lights, is not yet to say anything about the way in which 
                                               
understanding of “manifestation of good will”, unwitting omissions sometimes meet a laudable standard, and so, 
warrant praise’s invitations. Perhaps, just as one might be the fitting object of blame not only when one i) acts/omits 
in a way that manifests ill will, but also when ii) one’s act/omission manifests an absence of reasonably expected 
good will (Arpaly and Schroeder 2014: 168), so too one might be the fitting object of praise not only when one a) 
acts/omits in a way that manifests good will, but also in some cases where b) one’s act/omission manifests an 
absence of reasonably expected ill will. (This may be especially plausible on a partly comparative view of 
laudatory standards.)  In speaking of “manifesting good will/regard” in this paper I don’t mean to exclude b). I 
thank David Shoemaker for raising this point and Gunnar Björnsson for discussion. 
13 While praiseworthy actions often are those that exceed what can be demanded of the agent, this seems not to be 
necessary. And, even if praiseworthiness requires that one exceed a demand, praise and blame might responsive 
to different kinds of normative considerations. Macnamara (2011: 92–93), for example, holds that praise responds 
not to the deontic (or rights-involving) significance of some action, but its evaluative significance, e.g. its being 
kind, generous, or otherwise morally good. See also Eshleman (2014: 228). 
14 See Martin (2014) on “normative hope”. 
15 I thank two anonymous referees for raising, from different angles, this concern. 
16 ‘Recognition’ should be understood non-factively (perhaps something like ‘recognizing as’). 
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praise is communicative.17 Presumably, praise does not direct laudability-recognizing demands. 
(This, anyway, was assumed at the outset.) But if it is to be included in a communicative view 
of the reactive attitudes, reactive praise should be intelligible as addressing its target somehow. 
My proposal, is that praise addresses (laudability-recognizing) invitations. A source of support 
for this proposal can be found in the nature of the response sought by reactive praise.  
 
2.3 The Response Moral Invitation Seeks 
I have proposed that approbation and gratitude direct moral invitations to their targets, 
invitations to jointly value the meaning of the addressee’s action for the praiser (the inviter). To 
make sense of this proposal we need to specify the kinds of valuing that the praiser and praisee 
engage in. The praiser initiates the valuing interaction, and his valuing of the laudable action 
comes in the form of approbation or gratitude. The praiser’s approbation (or gratitude) invites 
the laudable agent to emotionally engage with the praiser’s recognition of the action. What is 
sought, I maintain, is uptake in a self-reactive attitude that mirrors the content of the praiser’s 
attitude (Strawson 1962: 71). Differently put, praise invites a kind of pride— directed pride. 
Directed pride is an emotion to be sharply distinguished from the self-aggrandizing and 
arrogant responses sometimes associated with the ‘vice of pride’. Though the emotion of pride 
can be felt to an excessive degree approximating arrogance, I take it that just as one can feel 
guilt—a pained acknowledgement of the meaning of one’s wrongdoing for another—without 
manifesting a trait of being, say, self-disparaging, so too one can feel pride without manifesting 
the trait of being self-aggrandizing. Next, directed pride is a species of agential pride, pride 
about something that an agent has done (/omitted to do). As such, directed pride is to be 
contrasted with the non-agential pride one might feel about traits and dispositions not reflective 
of one’s agency, e.g. one’s naturally impeccable memory, one’s heritage. Directed pride, 
however, is not to be identified with agential pride, or even agential pride about laudable action. 
For, while directed pride is a reflexive attitude that is in an importance sense about one’s own 
expression of agency, its evaluative focus is the meaning for another of one’s manifestation of 
good will. Although directed pride is a self-reactive attitude, it is less a way of registering that 
one “did the right thing”, than of registering the significance for another of one’s having 
                                               
17 This is so given the assumption that the form of address proper to the blame-manifesting reactive attitudes is 
demand. Macnamara (2013) rejects this assumption and understands the recognition involved in reactive 
attitudes—or rather, their expression— as itself communicative (it seeks acknowledgment).   
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“righted” her. (A similar point is sometimes made about the reactive attitude of guilt, which is 
not so much about having acted wrongly, as about one’s having wronged another.18) It is this 
focus on the praiser’s evaluative perspective that secures directed pride’s status as an 
interpersonal moral attitude. Sometimes the praiser’s evaluative perspective will be easily 
accessible to the praisee, for this perspective may have been among the considerations that 
motivated her to meet a laudatory standard in the first place. At other times, access to the 
praiser’s evaluative perspective may require some mental effort (e.g. where the laudatory action 
was performed long ago, or when one is praiseworthy for an unwitting omission (see fn. 12), 
etc.). In any case, in feeling directed pride one will be valuing one’s action mediated by 
appreciation of what the manifestation of good will meant for the praiser.  
In addition to feeling directed pride, acceptance of praise’s invitation involves 
communicating one’s acceptance, or “discursively registering” (Macnamara 2013: 909) one’s 
directed pride. In so doing, the praisee partakes in the social act of accepting credit for reaching 
a laudatory standard, reaffirming thereby her commitment to the standard’s value. This need 
not involve anything formal. Responses that might superficially appear to deflect expressions 
of praise— e.g. “don’t mention it”; “no problem”; “it was nothing”— are conventional ways of 
giving approbation and gratitude uptake. These normally count as ways of discursively 
registering praise’s invitations no less than do more explicit ways of expressing that one values 
the significance for another of one’s manifestation of good will (e.g. “I’m glad I was able to 
help”; “You are most welcome”).  
Given the backward-looking nature of praise’s invitations, acceptance of praise is a way 
of accepting credit for what one did from the praiser. While one can ‘take credit’ for an action 
independently of another’s praise, accepting credit is an interpersonal activity presupposing a 
moral invitation, a giving of credit. As the inviting and the accepting are both ways of valuing 
the same thing (from different perspectives), communicatively successful praise will consist in 
jointly valuing (and typically, given the nature of the emotions involved, taking joy in) the 
significance of the praiseworthy agent’s action.19 Successfully expressed praise thus gives rise 
to a relation wherein the praiser and praisee are engaged in valuing together, or “co-valuing”, 
                                               
18“Righting” roughly corresponds to what Shoemaker (2013) calls heighting, where “height” is a transitive verb 
that contrasts with “slight”. As Shoemaker writes (2013: 117) “[t]o slight someone is to take him (his normative 
perspective, his interests) insufficiently seriously. For the opposite I will coin a phrase: to height someone is to 
take him (his normative perspective, his interests) very seriously. And as being slighted renders fitting anger, being 
heighted renders fitting gratitude.”    
19 Elinor Mason (2019: 108) makes a similar point. 
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the praiseworthy agent’s action. For, when praise is accepted, receiving uptake in the 
addressee’s directed pride, the praiser and praisee mutually recognize one another as standing 
for a common value.20 As their co-valuing is irreducible to their valuing severally—which can 
obtain independently of reactive praise— co-valuing can be understood as “the valuational 
counterpart to shared agency” (Callard 2018: 130).21 Co-valuing of this sort may include actions 
that convey the relevant attitudes, but given that other-directed intentions are inessential to the 
phenomenon— for, expression of emotion is such that one need not intend to communicate 
either one’s praise or directed pride— co-valuing is an agential phenomenon that has at its core 
non-volitional moral psychological dispositions and responses.22 
To make this talk of co-valuing more concrete, suppose Lorenz praises his neighbor, a 
retired lawyer named Adrian, for Adrian’s generosity in volunteering several days per week to 
provide legal resources and advice to refugees seeking asylum. Lorenz is moved by Adrian’s 
good will, which resonates with him particularly given his family history. It is not difficult to 
imagine Lorenz expressing his approbation by saying something like, ‘I think what you’re doing 
is really wonderful. I remember when my family moved here…’ Here, Lorenz invites Adrian 
to take credit for his laudatory action, from his perspective on the determinate value that 
underlies Adrian’s laudatory action. Lorenz’s praise reflects the significance for him of 
Adrian’s action, and as such it is an invitation that takes the salient elements of Lorenz’s 
evaluation (reflective of the meaning of the action for him) as the ground on which to jointly 
value the action. In a certain sense, then, Lorenz hosts the co-valuing. Supposing Adrian accepts 
Lorenz’s invitation, he will do so partly on the terms specified by Lorenz’s way of valuing 
Adrian’s action. Given the nature of the attitudes involved, when approbation or gratitude finds 
uptake in directed pride, the praiser and praisee come to value together the initial action, and 
do so on the terms specified by the praiser’s invitation. But although successful praise involves 
both praiser and praisee affirming a common value, and although the praiser hosts the praising 
interaction in the above sense, the invitation has a special kind of significance for the praisee, 
                                               
20 In some cases this sharing may be partial, e.g. where the praisee and praiser have non-identical conceptions of 
(what is nonetheless) the same value. (How to determine what degree of valuational overlap is sufficient for co-
valuing, I do not know.) I thank an anonymous reviewer for raising this point. 
21 Since praise involves non-instrumental satisfaction in the action valued, the sense of co-valuing I discuss is 
importantly different from what Bratman (albeit tentatively) calls “shared valuing”; the latter has its basis in shared 
policies, which are devised for the purposes of interpersonal coordination and as such, might be valued only 
instrumentally (Bratman 2007: 303-7). What Hedahl and Huebner (2018) call shared valuing comes closer to what 
I mean by co-valuing. 
22 I take this to be true of valuing generally; see Scheffler (2010). 
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in virtue of its being a way of recognizing her praiseworthy action. It is, in a sense, a moral 
celebration held for her. 
Talk of ‘celebration’ here should not be taken literally. Indeed, some ways of celebrating 
(and otherwise publicly recognizing) an agent’s moral achievement will not count as 
communicative praise. Imagine a celebratory event in which community members unite to 
commemorate moral heroes past, primarily as a way of affirming their shared history and 
promoting group solidarity. Though this event will involve public recognition of laudatory 
actions, to the extent that this recognition does not seek uptake from the praiseworthy agents, it 
will not be an instance of praise in the moral address sense of interest to the communicative 
theorist.23   
2.4. Failed Invitations  
Praise is communicatively successful when its invitation receives uptake in the acceptance of 
credit constituted by the praiseworthy agent’s discursively registered directed pride, therein 
giving rise to co-valuation. Or rather, this is what it is for praise to be i) fully successful ii) qua 
moral address. We can imagine cases in which praise’s invitation is understood as such, but 
where, for one reason or another, receipt of this invitation fails to eventuate in directed pride. 
More generally, we can come up with an array of less-than-fully successful instances of 
invitational praise. The “failed invitations” I discuss below are failures in the stronger sense 
that they are wholly unsuccessful. Second, talk of praise’s ‘success’ here is limited to its success 
qua form of address. Reactive praise may have functions other than that of moral address, and 
there are certainly other standards by which we can assess any given praise-manifesting attitude 
as successful (e.g. forward-looking standards).24   
Praise’s invitational success requires that the addressee have certain capacities, chief 
among which is the capacity to accept credit via directed pride, and by extension, to understand 
the laudatory standards that praise’s invitation represents one to have met. Since we can be 
                                               
23 This kind of solidarity-promoting celebration might be better conceptualized as the positive analogue of 
something like protest. See fn.5.    
24 Praise plausibly also has a social function of signaling to members of the community that the praiser is 
committed to the value underlying the action praised, and perhaps therefore, that the praisee is prepared to, e.g. act 
in a manner consistent with the value, ‘give credit where credit is due’, etc. For a recently advanced costly signaling 
account of blame, see Shoemaker and Vargas (2019). Additionally, it may be that certain positive reactive attitudes 
have functions other than those they possess in virtue of being responses of praise. For example, Darwall’s (2019) 
category of “second-personal attitudes of the heart” identifies in gratitude a kind of function that is lacking in 
approbation (but present in other non-praising attitudes, like trust). 
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benefitted by persons whose benefitting actions are not manifestations of benevolence—and so, 
which do not meet a laudatory standard, despite initial appearances— some apparently 
praiseworthy actions might fail to warrant moral invitation. This may be because the benefitting 
agent lacks the capacity to understand (and participate in the practice of) moral invitation. A 
month-old child might benefit me (suppose his crying awakens me, enabling me to avoid 
missing an important deadline) and while it is psychologically possible that I construe his crying 
to have been benevolently motivated, any reactive praise that I express toward the baby will 
fail to receive proper uptake owing to the baby’s lacking the abovementioned capacities. The 
baby is not reachable by moral invitations; he is incapable of understanding the standards to 
which moral invitations respond and so cannot accept credit.25 Agents who lack the capacity to 
understand praise’s invitations and thereby to participate in our praise practices are standardly 
exempt from reactive praise.26 
Are the capacities without which one is exempt from reactive praise the same as those 
without which on is exempt from reactive blame? They might be, as a matter of psychological 
fact, but they are conceptually distinct. Further, if praise and blame are ultimately sensitive to 
different kinds of normative considerations, e.g. evaluative and deontic, respectively 
(Macnamara 2011; Eshleman 2014), an agent might possess the capacities requisite for reactive 
praise but not reactive blame (or possess the capacities to different extents). Justin Coates 
(2019: 168) has recently argued that toddlers may be the proper objects of praise-manifesting 
attitudes like gratitude, even when they are not yet proper objects of blaming attitudes.27 This, 
Coates argues, is because incipient competence in some domain is sufficient for meriting praise, 
while a general and consistent capacity to understand and be motivated by the relevant 
considerations in a domain is necessary for blame to be merited. And, toddlers’ benefitting 
                                               
25 Non-accidentally, the baby will also be unable to give others credit via moral invitation (though she may be 
pleased by what others do). I take it that being morally responsible for one’s conduct entails the ability to 
emotionally hold oneself, and others, responsible. See, Russell (2004), who calls this the “condition of moral 
sense”. Put in terms of moral address, the strategy is one of, as Watson puts it (1987: 228-29), “constru[ing] the 
exempting conditions as indications of the constraints on intelligible moral demand”. See also Darwall (2006: 79); 
Shoemaker (2015: 189 n16); McKenna (2012: 81-2). 
26 Is it not possible for an agent to act in a way that meets a laudatory standard yet, for one reason or another, be 
unable to give uptake to moral invitation? This will be difficult to deny if it is cognitively more demanding to give 
praise’s invitations discursive uptake than it is to be manifest laudatory quality of regard. At present, I can only 
register my view that a complete account of communicative praise ought to inform us not only of the conditions 
under which agents are exempt from reactive praise, but also of the nature and norms of marginal agency within 
our invitational praise practices. (See Shoemaker (2015) for pioneering work.) Thanks to Andreas Carlsson-Brekke 
and Daniel Story for raising this point. 
27 Stout (2020) makes a similar point and suggests too that owing to their fledgling moral capacities, young children 
are subject to lower “laudatory standards”. 
 
 15 
actions can display “incipient appreciation for others’ moral significance” (Coates 2019: 167). 
Given the scalar nature of evaluative concepts, this asymmetry in depth of capacity requisite 
for praise and blame might track a difference in the kinds of normative considerations that must 
be grasped to merit praise and blame, respectively. The toddler, in his incipient capacity to 
grasp some varieties of moral goodness, might be able to understand and be motivated to act in 
genuinely kind ways. But, it may be that some richer forms of goodness, e.g. those of heroism, 
are yet beyond him. In that case, in directing approbation and gratitude towards these aspiring 
members of the moral community, we may be (less and less proleptically) inviting them further 
into the community of responsible agents.28 
Praise’s invitations can fail in another way explicable by features of the addressee. The 
agent may be capable of manifesting laudably good will, but behave in circumstances that 
undermine her being the fitting target of moral invitation. Despite appearing to act in a way that 
fulfils a laudatory standard, her act will fail to merit moral invitation if it is performed under 
circumstances that preclude its being a manifestation of good regard, e.g. by being performed 
from ignorance, under hypnosis, etc. Here the target is an intelligible addressee of moral 
invitation, but the circumstances are such that prospective praisers have reason to block (or 
rescind) the kind of invitation naturally issued in circumstances of the sort. With blame, these 
correspond to cases in which the blamee has an excuse, or acts from excusing conditions. We 
can call conditions that temporarily undermine an otherwise responsible agent’s meriting moral 
invitation, overlooking conditions. When Larry trips on his inanely long shoelaces, and in so 
doing accidently ‘tackles’ a belligerent passenger who poses a threat to the safety of those 
onboard, Larry behaves from overlooking conditions.29 For although his behavior benefits those 
onboard and would be the fitting target of praise were it the laudatory manifestation of regard 
that it appears to be, the non-voluntariness of this benefit is such that others have reason to 
overlook it in their practices of moral invitation. When, falsely but understandably believing 
Larry to have manifested good will, the other passengers respond with a grateful ovation, Larry 
is the addressee of an undeserved moral invitation.  Unlike the exempt agent, Larry is capable 
of understanding the relevant laudatory standards and invitations they merit, and so he can 
decline the moral invitation. He can also accept, in which case he unfittingly takes credit for 
the non-laudatory benefit. 
                                               
28 On the idea that we “scaffold the moral agency of others” see McGeer (2012: 9, 2018). Also, Vargas (2013). 
29 David et al. (03:21–05:26). 
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3. The Normativity of Moral Invitation  
3.1 Directives 
If praise-manifesting attitudes sought uptake only in the sense that these attitudes satisfy their 
etiological function by eliciting a certain kind of response in their targets, the normativity of 
reactive praise would be left out of the picture. My fear (or that of the infant or the gibbon) 
might in this sense seek uptake in the fear of conspecifics within the immediate environment, 
but reactive attitudes seem to seek a response in a further sense. In seeking a response, they 
seem to put normative pressure on others to respond as called for. At least, when the 
communicative theorist says that reactive blame makes a moral demand of its target, they are 
not claiming (only or primarily) that ‘blame satisfies its internal aim when it receives uptake’. 
Part of what it is for these demands to be forms of moral address is that they are, when valid, 
reason-giving. Indeed, the blameworthy blamee is naturally understood not only as having a 
reason to respond to blame’s address, but as being bound to do so. That is, compliance is what 
blame’s demands seek. 
 Now, praise’s invitations don’t seek compliance. For invitations lack the imperatival 
force of demands. But, directives other than moral demands have reason-giving force. To make 
a valid request, for example, is not simply to point out an option available to the addressee and 
express a preference about it, but ordinarily to give someone a reason to do as requested.30 
Suppose you request the use of an acquaintance’s bike. This request does not have the force of 
a demand—and so, can be rejected on grounds that would not suffice for rejecting a valid 
demand to use the bike. The addressee has some discretion concerning whether (and perhaps, 
how) to do as requested.31 Nevertheless, simply preferring that you not use it may not be an 
adequate reason to reject an acquaintance’s request. While rejecting your request on these 
grounds might not be wrong, in the sense of violating a right of yours to the bike, it may 
nonetheless be a criticizable response to your valid request.32 
                                               
30 Ordinarily, but not necessarily. When a request is made that another fulfil some (e.g. promissory) obligation 
already owed to the requester, it’s not obvious that the request provides the addressee with further reason to do as 
obligated. I thank an anonymous reviewer for this example.   
31 That the normativity of requests is discretionary is the standard view. See Raz (1975: 83, 1988: 36-37, 2009: 
14-15); Enoch (2011, 2014); Lewis (2018). But see Cupit (1994) and Glaeser (2019). 
32Whether a given request is valid (i.e. its gives rise to a practical reason for the addressee) is typically dependent 
on the nature of the relationship within which it is issued. (A request from one’s mentee may give one reason not 
provided by the otherwise similar request of the stranger). But this holds true too of imperatival directives. See 
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 Requests are particularly relevant here for the following reason: invitations are plausibly 
a species of request. (This, anyway, is true of the kind of invitation at issue: directed 
invitation).33 Consider formal expressions of invitation that we sometimes employ: “you are 
cordially requested to join us in celebrating…”, “we cordially request your attendance at…”.  
These invitations do not merely offer their addressee a place at the events in question; they ask 
one to join. Being requests of a special short, valid invitations provide their addressees with 
discretionary reason to do as invited. Invitations gives their addressee reason to ‘do something’ 
(because invited), where this reason lacks the imperatival force of a demand. The reasons 
provided by invitations are not conclusive reasons for compliance. Though the reasons issued 
by reactive praise are gentler than those provided by a valid normative demand, they 
nonetheless possess genuine normative force. They may, as Martin (2019: 11) notes, “carry 
with them a certain legitimate pressure to accept, where the invitee needs a good reason to 
refuse (beyond say “I don’t feel like it”)”. So, although invitations importantly differ from non-
invitational requests in paradigmatically giving another reason to do something desirable, 
together (Geis 1995: 113), enjoyability doesn’t entail electivity. Praise provides the addressee 
with a directive reason to accept, where acceptance and denial are not, normatively speaking, 
on a par. But given that they possess only weak directive force, they may be declined without 
generating the kind of normative burden incurred by shirking a demand. While it might not 
ordinarily be wrong to fail to accept a valid invitation, it may be otherwise criticizable, e.g. as 
ungracious, conceited, unkind, etc.34  
One might worry about this talk of directive reasons for (and possible criticizability for 
failing to accept) praise’s invitations. After all, on this proposal, praise invitation’s provide the 
addressee with directive reason for an emotion (directed pride). But, we cannot simply choose 
to have some emotion in response to a directive. Nevertheless, while feeling directed pride is 
not itself within our direct voluntary control, many felicitous directives are for responses that 
include non-voluntary components. For example, one cannot will himself to have a change in 
skin tone, but assuming he is a ‘tanable’ agent, one can nonetheless comply with the command 
                                               
Enoch (2011: 7). This point can help with the intuition that it can sometimes be wrong to fail to accept a valid 
request. In declining a request one might, for instance, violate a relationship-dependent duty.  
33A weaker claim, though, will suffice for my purposes, namely that invitation can be understood by analogy to 
request, but is a sui generis directive. For, the pragmatics of request are admittedly importantly different from 
those of invitation; unlike the requestee, the invitee, for example, is not doing the addressor a favor in accepting 
(nor do inviters want invitees to view invitations thus). See Kukla (2018). 
34 For related discussion concerning reasons for action, see Dancy (2004: 103) and Little and Macnamara (2017). 
 
 18 
to get a suntan. Analogously (though no analogy is perfect), although one cannot will himself 
to feel directed pride, assuming he is a normatively competent agent—responsive to the 
interpersonal norms (or “laudatory standards”) that are the normative stuff of moral 
praiseworthiness— he will (absent special circumstances) be able to accept praise’s invitations. 
For, being a normatively competent agent, the praisee will have the ability to direct his attention 
in the called-for way to the inviter’s evaluative perspective on the praiseworthy action. While 
one’s attending thus isn’t guaranteed to translate into directed pride, assuming the praisee 
possesses the capacity to feel directed pride in response to others’ praise (without which he will 
not be the fitting target of praise in the first place), the praisee will have the capacity to accept 
praise’s invitations.35 We can imagine (perhaps with some difficulty) a conceited agent who 
cares about manifesting laudatory quality of regard, and does so for the right reasons)— and so 
is the fitting target of reactive praise, but who routinely ignores the moral invitations that others 
direct him in praise. In his case, however, the praisee will effectively be refusing others’ 
invitations for co-valuation.  
 Why, though, would one decline an invitation of fitting praise? If credit is due, why not 
accept credit? One important reason can be found in a briefly mentioned feature of directed 
invitation, one that distinguishes it from non-invitational request: the inviter hosts. It is an 
important part of invitational view that what is sought is not only that the praiseworthy agent 
take credit, but accept credit from the praiser. We can imagine cases in which facts about a 
given praiser undermine (in the praisee’s eyes or in reality, or both) the reason that the praisee 
has to accept credit. Even if the praisee takes the praise to be sincere, if the praiser lacks a 
certain kind of commitment to the relevant value, the praisee may be in a position to reasonably 
ignore or rebuff that praiser’s praise.36 
The idea that, in directing another with a laudability-recognizing invitation, the praiser 
proposes to host an interaction of co-valuing helps us understand something further, namely 
why it may be disrespectful (or some such) for a praiseworthy agent to seek to accept credit 
prior to being invited to do so. For, invitations are a kind of directive through which the inviter 
not only gives the addressee normative reason to do as invited; the directive comes with the 
offer to host that which the requestee is directed to do. Thus, directed invitations also provide 
                                               
35Additionally, this is not an objection to the invitational view as such (nor one the communicative theorist is in a 
position to raise), given that blame, on the communicative view, demands from the culpable agent a response that 
involves guilt or remorse.  
36 [] 
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their addressee with a kind of permission. Unlike the request that you, say, repark your car onto 
the opposite side of the street, a directed invitation gives the addressee permission to do 
something otherwise impermissible (e.g. to show up at one’s home with the expectation of a 
meal and company, in the case of a dinner invitation). In light of the consideration that moral 
invitations are (backward-looking) directed invitations, and that the latter are a kind of 
permission-giving directive, imagine an agent who manifests good will and proceeds to say 
(unsarcastically, sincerely), “you’re welcome!” or “I’m happy to have helped” etc., 
independently of others’ praise. Though this agent does merit praise, in purporting to accept 
credit independently of sensitivity to others’ evaluative perspectives on his action—this credit-
taker ignores the social meaning of his manifestation of good will. Though he is correct in 
representing himself as worthy of moral invitation, by valuing his action independently of 
concern for the perspective of those (albeit positively) affected, this agent arguably disrespects 
(or at least gives insufficient weight to) others as reason-giving participants of the moral 
community.37 
3.2 Praise, Benefit, Desert 
Reactive blame is often understood to raise questions of desert. On a version of this idea found 
in Watson (1996), because blaming responses characteristically affect the interests of the 
blamee, blame’s appropriateness depends on its being deserved. Blaming responses 
characteristically affect one’s interests in a particular way, i.e., adversely— or harm the blamee 
(Feinberg 1986; McKenna 2012: 134-141; Rosen 2004; Watson 1996; Wallace 1994; Bennett 
2002: 151-2). It is not implausible that blame characteristically harms the blamee partly in 
virtue of blame’s form of address, i.e., moral demand. This seems to be what McKenna claims 
in writing that “[a]s a conversational expression of moral expectations and demands, blame is 
liable to harm the blameworthy party by impeding her ability to enjoy and sustain normal 
interpersonal relationships, by interfering in her personal life, and by emotionally unsettling 
her” (McKenna 2012: 200, italics added). Though there may be features of blame that harm the 
blamee independently of their being expressive of moral demand, part of what the blamee 
                                               
37 This may indicate an asymmetry between praise and blame. For, there is often nothing wrong with the 
wrongdoer’s feeling and expressing guilt before being blamed; doing so may even be commendable. (Of course, 
if the agent’s ‘unprompted guilt’ excludes others’ contributions to his perspective on the social meaning of his act, 
this too will be objectionable.) This may be partly because blame’s address (unlike that of praise) reflects a 
previously disregarded normative consideration, one that perhaps persists in modified form after the wrongdoing. 
On this point see Gardner (2011: 33), also Nelkin (2015: 363). 
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deserves in being worthy of blame may be the special kind of harm characteristic of blame’s 
demands. Insofar as one cares about the moral significance of one’s actions for other agents, 
one’s being the addressee of valid moral demands will have moral psychological weight for 
one. 38In the absence of this kind of weight, it is not clear why there should be something painful 
in the sheer acknowledgement of one’s having wronged another. The further negative treatment 
often associated with reactive blame might derive its distinctive moral painfulness from its 
being expressive of (and not simply caused by) the valid moral demands of blame. If that’s 
right, when blame manifests itself through sanction-like responses, the pain of these responses, 
too, might be moral pain in light of one’s acknowledgment of (the gravity of) the moral demand 
expressed in that treatment. 
 I do not presuppose the view that part of what it is to be blameworthy in the reactive 
sense is for one to be a deserving target of blame’s interest-affecting demands. But, for those 
sympathetic to this kind of desert thesis, the invitational view has resources available for a 
corresponding interest-affecting desert thesis for praise. 39 For, it is not implausible that the 
invitational nature of praise is such that praise characteristically promotes the interests of, or 
benefits, the person praised. For, on the basis of being recognized to have met a laudatory 
standard, the praisee is given reason to partake in an interaction in which they are valued, in 
some determinate way disclosed to them by the reason-giver, for their meeting of that standard. 
Consider some of the characteristic ways in which the invitations of praise are manifested. 
Gestures of friendliness, increased trust, greater sympathy, etc., may all be ways in which 
praise’s moral invitations are expressed. Though these kinds of social goods might be valued 
by the egoist or the flattery-seeker purely for their instrumental or hedonic value, they have a 
distinctive kind of moral value for those that care about the interests and perspectives of others 
(for their own sake). For, these ways of being benefitted will not only be pleasure-promoting 
benefits, but expressive of another’s caring recognition of one’s own ways of regarding others; 
                                               
38 See McKenna (2012: 167). 
39The relevant kind of desert here is sometimes understood to be “basic desert”, such that if an agent is praiseworthy 
or blameworthy in the basic desert sense, he deserves praise or blame just because he performed the action (under 
the relevant conditions) and “not, for example, merely by virtue of consequentialist or contractualist 
considerations.” (Pereboom 2014: 2; Pereboom 2001; cf. Feinberg 1986; McKenna 2019: 155). See McKenna 
(2012) for discussion of views on which interest affecting responses of praise and blame can be deserved in a non-
basic sense. The desert involved in being deserving of praise or blame can be understood in thinner terms. For 
example, one’s deserving blame or praise might be understood in terms of one’s being the fitting target of some 
blame- or praise-manifesting emotion, such that that the evaluation made by that emotion is correct (D’Arms and 
Jacobson 2000). See Shoemaker (2015: 220-22).   
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as such, one will not only feel pleased, but gratified in being the recipient of another’s moral 
invitation.40 Directed pride, as I have characterized it, is a way of feeling thus gratified. As we 
desire not only to be praised but to be fittingly praised—relative to standards we ourselves value 
—fitting praise holds out the promise of being seen and treated as one holds dear. 
  With the invitational view of praise in hand, then, the communicative theorist who 
endorses a desert thesis can maintain that while being blameworthy in the relevant sense entails 
that one deserves the harm associated with blame’s demands, so too, being praiseworthy entails 
that one deserves the benefit associated with praise’s invitations. It should be clear that praise’s 
interest-promoting qualities do not depend on the praiser’s intending to benefit the praiseworthy 
agent. They are, rather, the ways in which our moral psychologies orient us toward those whom 
we perceive as the fitting target of responses like approbation and gratitude. It is no accident 
that we tend to grow warmer toward those whom we have occasion to admire, and be grateful 
to. Since the moral invitations of praise at a minimum aim to bring together the praiser and 
praisee, in the sense of calling the praisee to jointly value what their manifestation of good will 
meant for the praiser, praise’s invitations will unsurprisingly serve to form and strengthen 
various interpersonal relationships.  
 
Conclusion 
Moral invitation, I have argued, is among the forms of moral address we issue and recognize as 
responsible agents. Moral invitation, further, is plausibly the form of address lying at the heart 
of our praise-manifesting reactive attitudes. By illustrating the promise for an invitational 
conception of reactive praise for elucidating features of our responsibility practices often 
occluded by moral demands, I have mounted a case for identifying moral invitation as the form 
of address proper to our praise-manifesting reactive attitudes. On the view commended by 
broadening thus our conceptual repertoire, it remains true that “holding responsible requires the 
intelligibility of moral address…[where] a condition of such address is that the other be seen as 
a potential moral interlocutor” (Watson 1987: 235). It turns out, however, that we belong to a 
communicatively richer moral community than we may have supposed, one whose members 
are capable of addressing one another in multiple registers, demandingly and invitingly. Moral 
demands are essential to facilitating the moral repair required to mend our various relationships, 
                                               
40Thanks to David Shoemaker for suggesting “gratification” in this context. 
 
 22 
and the moral community thereby. Moral invitations, I propose, are essential to facilitating the 
formation and strengthening of our various relationships, and the moral community thereby.41  
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